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Abstract: Adaptive Psychological Profiling is the process of determining a person’s internal mental state through the 
analysis of a person’s non-verbal behaviour. Silent Talker is a pioneering psychological profiling system 
which was developed by experts in behavioural neuroscience and computational intelligence. Designed for 
use in natural conversation, Silent Talker combines image processing and artificial intelligence to classify 
multiple visible non-verbal signals of the face during verbal communication to produce an accurate and 
comprehensive time-based profile of a subject’s psychological state. Silent Talker uses a unique configuration 
of artificial neural networks, hence, it is difficult to understand how the classification of a person’s behaviour 
is obtained. New legislation in the form of GDPR, now requires individuals whom are automatically profiled, 
to have the right to an explanation of how the “machine” reached its decision and receive meaningful 
information on the logic involved. This is difficult in practice, both from a technical and legal point of view. 
This paper, uses an application of psychological profiling within a pilot system known as iBorderCtrl, which 
detects deception through an avatar border guard interview during a travellers pre-registration to demonstrate 
the challenges faced in trying to obtain explainable decisions from models derived through Computational 
Intelligence techniques. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Psychological Profiling is a technique most well 
known as a tool used within criminal investigations 
utilising methodologies from both law enforcement 
and psychology (Bonn, 2017). It involves the detailed 
and intricate analyses of the non-verbal behaviour of 
a person, often in an interview situation to detect their 
mental state. The expertise and training required by a 
human to undertake this kind of profiling is complex 
– requiring simultaneous conjecture of many non-
verbal signals. Adaptive psychological profiling 
utilises computational intelligence techniques to 
build models of non-verbal behaviour for different 
mental states, i.e. deceptive behaviour or more 
recently to detect comprehension levels in education. 
For example, Silent Talker (2018), a profiling system 
for lie detection uses hierarchies of neural networks 
to module deceptive behaviour. However, neural 
networks are by nature ‘black boxes’ where it is 
difficult to understand how the trained networks 
determine if a person is deceiving or not.   
The European data protection reform package that 
came into force in May 2018 consists of the General 
Data Protection Regulation (Regulation 
679/2016/EU, “GDPR”) and the “law enforcement 
directive (680/2016/EU). The GDPR potentially has 
a worldwide impact on business models and research 
activities carried out within industry and academic 
institutions that utilise computational intelligence 
(CI) algorithms. Specifically, it states the rights of an 
individual not to be subject to automated decision-
making, such as profiling, unless explicit consent is 
given. In addition, in any aspect of automated 
decision making, the individual has the right to either 
opt out or be provided with an explanation of how the 
automated decision was reached. This would be 
achieved through disclosure of “the logic involved” 
(article 13 (GDPR, 2016). When profiling, the data 
controller should use appropriate mathematical and 
statistical procedures and that data should be accurate 
(free from bias) in order to minimize the risk of errors. 
This legislation presents many challenges when 
using CI for modelling complex problems that 
involve people. How do we provide an explainable 
 
decision suitable for all stakeholders when using 
‘black box’ CI algorithms? The stakeholders are the 
experts who designed, validated and tested the 
system, the business or customer who commission the 
system and the member of the public who receives the 
automated decision from the system. This paper 
explores this issue using an application of an 
automated deception detection system utilised within 
a pilot system known as iBorderCtrl, which detects 
deception through an avatar border guard interview 
during a travellers pre-registration. The finial l neural 
network classifiers are replaced with traditional 
decision trees to provide a set of rules on how 
decisions about deceptive behaviour are reached. The 
complexity and size of the rule sets produced show 
that whilst an expert, may have some understanding 
of the rules, it would be extremely difficult for a 
member of the public to understand and the expert 
could not be able to say precisely why these particular 
rules were derived or explain what they mean.  
Section 2 of this paper defines what is meant by 
psychological profiling in the context of this work, 
whilst Section 3 explains the legal perspective of 
some aspects of automated decision making in light 
of the GDPR. The case study of profiling EU 
travellers is described in Section 4 and used to 
illustrate the challenges of developing explainable 
profiling systems. Section 5 provides the 
methodology used to conduct empirical experiments 
on a deception detection profiling system and 
presents results using both neural networks and 
decision trees in terms of explainability. Finally, 
section 6 provides some important considerations for 
both the legal and computational intelligence 
communities.  
2 PSYCHOLOGICAL PROFILING 
OVERVIEW 
Adaptive Psychological Profiling is the process of 
determining a person’s internal mental state (beliefs, 
desires, and intentions) through analysing their 
external behaviour by means of Computational 
Intelligence (CI) based components. Furthermore, it 
is based on a generic architecture which is adapted to 
different application domains and optimised through 
a process of machine learning. The first such 
architecture is known as “Silent Talker” (ST)    
(Bandar et al., 2004). ST uses complex interactions 
between non-verbal features in a moving video feed 
from an interviewee to classify truthful or deceptive 
behaviour. The ST architecture has been adapted for 
different internal mental states. One such adaptation 
is for comprehension in intelligent tutoring in the 
classroom (Holmes et al 2018). Another ethnic / 
cultural adaptation extended comprehension 
classification to Tanzanian women for informed 
consent in a clinical trial (Buckingham et al, 2014). 
Other ongoing work includes an avatar based 
deception detection interview integrated into a smart 
border crossing system (Crockett et al, 2017). The 
case study used in this paper focuses on the complex 
problem of the psychological profiling of liars – the 
next section looks more deeply into the science of 
lying and why this in particular a challenging problem 
for computational intelligence in terms of building a 
model and in trying to explain automated decision 
making.  
2.1 The Science of Lying   
There are various different types of lie, with 
different contextual motivations and different ways of 
classifying them. For example Ganis et al. (2003) 
used two classes, whether the lies fit into a coherent 
story and whether they were previously memorized. 
Alternatively, Feldman et al. (2002) presented a 
taxonomy of lies with 10 coding’s, for lies produced 
by participants with 3 different self-presentational 
goals. Regardless of context, there is a general 
psychological principle that the act of deceiving 
produces changes in behaviour has a long history 
dating back to the Hindu Dharmasastra of Gautama, 
(900 – 600 BC) and the philosopher Diogenes (412 – 
323 BC) according to Trovillo (1939).   
There are a number of factors, proposed by 
psychologists which may be influential drivers of 
behavioural change during deception. These are 
general arousal / stress, cognitive load, behaviour 
control and special cases of arousal, guilty knowledge 
and duping delight. Stress is the oldest driver to be 
measured for lie detection. Following work by 
Angelo Mosso in the late 19th and early 20th centuries 
using pulse and blood pressure, the polygraph was 
invented by Larson in 1921 (International League of 
Polygraph Examiners, 2016). The Cognitive Load 
driver derives from the work of George A. Miller 
(1956), whose Magical Number 7 (+/- 2) indicated 
that there were a limited number of “mental 
variables” that an individual could process 
concurrently. Therefore, someone trying to construct 
and remain consistent with a false account would be 
under increased cognitive load. Behaviour control 
occurs when deceptive interviewees deliberately try 
to control themselves in order to make an honest and 
convincing impression. It is postulated that attempts 
to control behaviour will increase in higher-stakes 
scenarios (Caso et al., 2005). Guilty knowledge 
(Concealed Knowledge) is a test of whether a suspect 
has information related to a crime that an innocent 
 
person would not possess. When exposed to such 
information an interviewee is expected to produce a 
reaction detected by instrumentation (MacLaren et 
al., 2001). Duping delight is believed to occur in an 
interview when the deceiver experiences pleasurable 
excitement at the prospect of successfully deceiving 
the interviewer, particularly in the presence of 
observers (Sen et al., 2018). 
 
2.2. Automated Lie Detection 
The field of computational intelligence provides a 
wealth of algorithms which are suitable to build 
models of liars automatically. Silent Talker (ST) 
(Silent Talker, 2018) differs from many other lie 
detectors in its assumption that deceptive non-verbal 
behaviour is the outcome of a combination of 
psychological drivers and that it cannot be 
characterized by a simple, single indicator. ST uses 
complex interactions between multiple channels of 
microgestures over time to determine whether the 
behaviour is truthful or deceptive. A microgesture is 
a very fine-grained non-verbal gesture, such as the 
right-eye moving from half-open to closed. This can 
combine with other microgestures from the right eye 
to detect a wink or both eyes to detect a blink. 
Measured over time these can combine to measure 
blink rate. Complex combinations and interactions of 
typically 38 channels and interactions between them 
can be compiled into a long vector, over a time slot, 
which can be used to classify behaviour as truthful or 
deceptive over the slot. Microgestures are 
significantly different from micro expressions 
(proposed in other systems), because they much more 
fine-grained and require no functional psychological 
model of why the behaviour has taken place. 
Furthermore, because there are so many channels 
contributing to the analysis, behaviour control is 
infeasible. Typically, using a recording device such 
as a web cam, salient features (e.g. eye half) are 
identified in an individual video frame by a layer of 
object locators. The states of the objects are detected 
by the pattern detectors (e.g. eye half open). The 
channel coders complied the outputs of the pattern 
detectors over time (e.g. sequence of eye movement 
indicating a blink) and the deception classifier uses 
this long vector compiled by the channel coders. The 
ST approach to lie detection is based on a “black box” 
model, the conjecture that these and other (unknown) 
factors act as drivers of non-verbal behaviour, 
resulting in distinctive features that can be used to 
discriminate between deceivers and truth-tellers. 
Silent Talker is in itself an automated profiling 
system and is being piloted as basis for an automated 
deception detection system to profile travellers 
crossing European borders at a pre-registration phase 
and we will be described in section 4 of this paper.   
3      THE GDPR  
3.1 Automated decision-making under the 
GDPR 
 
From a legal perspective, various issues arise. In 
2016, the European Union agreed on a data protection 
reform package including the General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR) (Regulation (EU) 
2016/679, 2016), which went into force on 25 May 
2018. The GDPR introduces various new regulations 
which affect both profiling and the use of 
computational intelligence-based systems. As 
explained above, profiling and automated decision-
making are both covered by art. 22 GDPR. According 
to art 22 (1) GDPR, an automated decision is a 
decision based solely on automated processing, 
including profiling, which produces legal effects 
concerning him or her or similarly significantly 
affects him or her. One of the most obvious 
challenges in this regard is the fact that almost any 
decision in an increasingly digitized world might 
have at least a mediate legal effect as well (Von 
Lewinski, 2018). Therefore, the interpretation of this 
requirement should be rather restrictive, whereas any 
single case shall be assessed based on objective 
factors (Martini, 2018a). While this result seems to be 
sound and necessary, persons without a legal 
background might face difficulties in assessing 
whether their decision is to be seen as automated 
decision-making or not. In particular, decisions which 
do not produce any legal or other similarly significant 
effects are not subject to art. 22 GDPR. An automated 
lie detection system, however, will most probably 
always cause significant effects on the persons, both 
from possible use-cases, as well as with regard to 
personality rights (e.g. reputation).  
 
3.2 Safeguards and information 
obligations 
 
For decisions falling within the scope of art. 22 
GDPR, certain safeguards need to be considered. 
According to art. 22 (3) GDPR, the data controller 
shall implement suitable measures to safeguard the 
data subject's rights and freedoms and legitimate 
interests, at least the right to obtain human 
intervention on the part of the controller, to express 
his or her point of view and to contest the decision. 
While these requirements could be easily 
implemented from both an organisational and 
technical point of view, additional obligations can be 
 
found in the data subject’s rights: According to art. 13 
(2) lit. f), 14 (2) lit. g) and 15 (1) lit. h) GDPR, the 
data controller is required to inform the data subject 
about  
 the existence of automated decision-making as 
referred to in art. 22,  
 meaningful information about the logic involved, 
and  
 the significance and the envisaged consequences 
of such processing for the data subject. 
 In addition, information has to be provided in 
concise, transparent, intelligible and easily 
accessible form, Art. 12 (1) GDPR. This also 
applies to information obligations regarding 
automated decision-making (Martini, 2018b).  
These regulations, however, are not sufficiently 
clear from a legal point of view (Bräutigam & 
Schmidt-Wudy, 2015). While it shouldn’t be a 
practical problem to inform about the existence of 
automated decision-making, it remains unclear what 
is meant with “meaningful information on the logic 
involved”. Also, the criteria for assessing whether 
information provided complies with the requirements 
imposed by art. 12 (1) GDPR, meaning that they 
should be in intelligible form, are unclear. 
 
3.3 Meaningful information on the logic 
involved 
 
Providing meaningful information can be challenging 
in practice. In particular, algorithms used for 
automated decision-making might be at the same time 
crucial for certain business models. Therefore, 
revealing the whole algorithm would interfere with 
the legitimate interest of companies to protect their 
trade secrets. In that regard, the German 
Constitutional Court ruled in 2014 that the “Schufa”, 
a credit scoring institute, was not obliged to reveal 
their algorithm as it was at the same time a trade 
secret (German Constitutional Court, 2014). 
According to the ruling, only the personal 
information which had been considered for a scoring 
decision should be subject to the information 
obligations. However, it has to be noted that this 
decision does not reflect the GDPR, but the German 
national data protection act which was based on the 
former data protection directive 95/46/EC. However, 
protecting algorithms also for trade secrets remains a 
crucial interest of many companies offering services 
in a digital society. Therefore, the GDPR shall be 
interpreted in a way which would not impose such an 
obligation either (Roßnagel et al. 2015).  In particular, 
recital 63 states that the right to access should not 
adversely affect the rights or freedoms of others, 
including trade secrets and intellectual property 
rights. Therefore, providing information on the basic 
functioning of an algorithm appears to be sufficient to 
comply with the obligation to provide meaningful 
information (Paal & Henneman, 2018). Even though 
the answer to this question might be subject to 
upcoming jurisdiction (Schmidt-Wudy, 2018a). 
     However, technical phenomena like the “black 
box” often associated with neural network type 
systems and deep learning would impose additional 
challenges for this requirement. Self-learning 
algorithms might adjust their functioning and 
resolving how they actually behave might be difficult. 
In addition, information would need to be updated 
frequently, based on the algorithm’s adjustments. 
While it would be at least possible to provide 
information on how the algorithm learns, it might be 
questionable in how far this would be to provide 
sufficient information necessary to ensure a fair and 
transparent processing (see recital 60). Consequently, 
a proper solution for this issue remains unclear.  
 
3.4 Intelligible information for the data 
subject 
 
Another legal issue with regard to the information 
obligations is the requirement to provide intelligible 
information. This leaves room for certain 
interpretation: Should the information be intelligible 
for the data controller, for the individual data subject, 
or rather for an objective, reasonable and informed 
third party? (Schmidt-Wudy, 2018b). In that regard, 
it needs to be considered that data controllers might 
have a substantial advantage both in knowledge of 
their systems and technology in general. While 
detailed technical information could be on the one 
hand seen as a maximum level of transparency, an 
average data subject will most probably not be able to 
understand such information. Therefore, information 
should be less detailed than it would be theoretically 
possible if this ensures that the data subject can 
actually understand the information. This is also 
reflected in art. 12 and recital 58, stating that the data 
subject shall be addressed using clear and plain 
language. Last but not least, another challenge is the 
fact that data subjects can have very different 
background-knowledge helping them to understand 
information. People who frequently use ICT services 
might be more familiar with the functioning of 
algorithms than people who can barely use a 
computer. If the GDPR is required to ensure that 
every individual data subject understands the logic 
involved, data controllers would have no legal 
certainty as to whether they comply with the legal 
 
requirements or not. Therefore, the information 
provided to describe the logic involved should be 
intelligible for an objective, reasonable and informed 
third party persons (“the average user”), while at the 
same time providing as much information as possible.  
 
3.5 Challenges for the technical 
community 
 
As outlined above, many issues regarding automated 
decision-making derive from legal problems. 
However, there are certain issues which also require 
input and solutions from the technical community, in 
particular: 
 How to properly assess the legal situation 
regarding automated decision-making and on 
how to apply proper safeguards?  
 How to explain an algorithm without leaking 
trade secrets? 
 How can algorithms based on computational 
intelligence be explained?  
 Can the information on how an algorithm learns 
be sufficient to understand it’s functioning and 
decision-making? 
 Can self-learning algorithms also explain their 
decision-making, and could this be updated 
frequently for every user? 
4 CASE STUDY: PROFILING 
TRAVELLERS ACROSS 
SCHENGEN BORDERS 
iBorderCtrl, short for, Intelligent Portable ContROl 
SyStem is a  three year H2020 project, funded by the 
European Union, which is currently developing  
novel mobility concepts for land border security. The 
system will enable authorities to achieve higher 
throughput at the crossing points whilst guaranteeing 
high security level through faster processing of 
passengers within vehicles or pedestrians, whilst 
targeting criminal activities such as human 
trafficking, smuggling and terrorism. In addition, the 
system will aim to reduce the subjective control and 
workload of human border agents and to increase the 
objective control through non-invasive automated 
technologies. Through travellers engaging in a pre-
registration step, the aim is to ensure they have a 
speedier border crossing. (Crockett et al., 2017). A 
full description of the project can be found here 
http://www.icross-project.eu/ iBorderCtrl features a 
unique combination of state-of-the-art biometric tools 
which will provide risk scores to a Risk Based 
Assessment Tool (RBAT) that will act as an 
automated decision-maker on the status of the 
traveller as they arrive at the border crossing point 
(Green is proceed, Amber is second line check and 
Red is refusal). It is important to say that iBorderCtrl 
is a human in the loop system and therefore provides 
advice to human border guards who ultimately have 
the final say. The focus in this paper is on the profiling 
of travellers deceptive behaviour in the pre-
registration step using a physcholigical profiling 
system called ADDS (Automated Deception 
Detection system) (O’Shea et al, 2018) and how such 
a system when deployed in the field, provides 
numerous challenges if asked to provide an 
explainable decision to different stakeholders: the 
research and development team of ADDS, the Border 
Guards and their managers and the travellers using 
the system. The next section provides a brief 









Figure 1: ADDS Dataflow.
 
4.1 Automated Deception Detection 
system 
In the pre-registration phase, each traveller after 
entering the information about their trip will be 
required to be interviewed by a Border Guard avatar. 
Information is exchanged between the iBorderCtrl 
System and the ADDS system using a unique QR 
code which is generated per traveller trip. An 
overview of the ADDS dataflow can be found in 
figure 1. In the pilot studies, consenting adults who 
meet the ethical criteria will be asked 16 questions, 
similar to those asked at border crossing points. The 
interview will last less than 2.5 minutes. ADDS will 
be responsible for conducting the interview where the 
Avatar asks questions, utilising three attitudes 
(puzzled, neutral and positive) and two avatars, one 
male and one female which are randomly assigned. 
An example of a Border Guard avatar (designed by 
Stremble) is shown in Figure 2.   
 
Figure 2: Female Avatar Border Guard. 
The non-verbal behaviour of each video question 
response will be analysed by the Silent Talker system 
(O’Shea et al, 2018a) which will output, for each 
question, the deceptive risk score. In ADDS, 38 non-
verbal facial channels are utilized which vary in 
complexity. Each channel is coded to the bipolar 
measurement range [-1, 1] by the Channel 
Accumulator (O’Shea et al, 2018a) and ultimately are 
then grouped into channel vectors based upon a time 
slot (i.e. 1 to 3 seconds) before being encoded within 
the image vector. Figure 3, shows an example of the 
back end processing carried out by the Silent Talker 
component of ADDS. The bottom screen, displays the 
live video stream for a specific interview question, 
 
whilst on the right the number of truthful, deceptive 
and unknown slots are shown. At the conclusion of 
the interview, questions and interview risk scores and 
their associated classifications, along with one second 
worth of video frames are uploaded to the iBorderCtrl 
database to be used by Face Matching Module 






Figure 3: Backend Silent Talker Processing. 
 
5    METHODLOGY 
 
An empirical study was conducted using 30 
participants whose non-verbal behaviour was 
recorded whilst engaged in an online interview with a 
static border guard avatar (O’Shea et al., 2018a). The 
aim of the experiment was to derive models of 
truthful and deceptive non-verbal behaviour using 
both hierarchical neural networks and decision trees 
to classify deception and truthfulness. The hypothesis 
tested was:  
 
H0: A decision made by an automated deception 
profiling system can be explained using decision tree 
models  
H1: A decision made by an automated deception 
profiling system cannot be explained using decision 
tree models 
 
After ethically consenting to take part in the study, the 
30 participants took part in a role play exercise which 
involved packing a suitcase with 6 items typically 
taken on a holiday. Each participant was randomly 
assigned either a truthful or one of four deceptive 
scenarios designed to cover high and low stakes 
deception. For example, based on the literature, it was 
anticipated that a person being deceptive about 
packing some illegal agricultural produce would 
generate higher arousal levels than a person 
transporting drugs. Following the role play, 
participants were then interviewed by a border guard 
avatar and were asked 13 questions which are typical 
of those asked by border guards. Full details of the 
experimental methodology are described in (O’Shea, 
2018). Following data preparation (described in 
section 2.1), two classification models were 
developed. One based on the hierarchal ANN model 
used by Silent Talker and the other using infamous 
Quinlan’s C4.5 decision tree (Quinlan, 1994).  
5.1 Data   
From the image data of the 32 participants, 86584 
image vectors were collected where each vector 
contained the states of each of the 38 non-verbal 
channels. Ground truth was established for each 
participants interview question through knowledge of 
the scenario that they role played. I.e. truthful (43051 
image vectors) or deceptive (43535 image vectors). 
Out of the 32 participants, there were 17 deceptive 
and 15 truthful interviews, 22 males and 10 females 
with a mix of ethnicities. In ADDs, the final ANN 
classifies truthfulness or deceptiveness is based upon 
an activation level in the range [-1, 1] which was 
determined from the data set. The deception risk 
score, Dq, of each of the 13 questions was defined as  
 





                                                                (1) 
 
Where ds is the deception score of slot s and n is the 
total number of slots for the current question. In order 
to obtain a classification for each vector, the 
following thresholds were applied (O’Shea et, a. 
2018a). 
 
IF Question_risk (Dq) <= x THEN 
  Image vector class = truthful 
ELSE IF Question_risk (Dq) >= y THEN 
 Image vector class = deceptive 
ELSE 
 Indicates not classified 
END IF 
 
Where x = -0.05 and y = +0.05 []. Thus if a question 
risk score was within this range, a classification could 
not be allocated.  
 
5.2 Results and Analysis 
In (O’Shea et al, 2018a), two methods for training, 
validation and testing were reported: n-fold cross 
validation and leave pair out. The latter being more of 
 
an appropriate measurement of accuracy for unseen 
participants,  which is required when a system such 
as ADDS is deployed in the field. However, for the 
purposes of this paper, in the context of comparing 
models in terms of classification accuracy and their 
ability to produce an explainable decisions, cross 
validation is used as initial work showed there was 
little difference in  induced decision tree size.    With 
no ANN or C4.5 optimisation, the best tree from 
performing 10-fold cross validation contained 1072 
rules. Table 1 shows the overall classification 
accuracy of 10-fold cross validation for both the ANN 
(ADDS-ANN) and C4.5 (ADDS-DT) 
Table 1: 10-fold cross validation results 








97.03 96.66 96.8 
ADDS-
DT 
98.9 98.8 98.8 
 
5.2.1 Are Decisions Explainable? 
Figure 4 shows a snapshot of the best decision tree 
which contains 1072 rules.  
 
 
Figure 4: Rule Snapshot 
The rules induced from the dataset represent patterns 
of non-verbal behaviour for specified channels, when 
combined together allow the classification of 
deception verses truth for a given risk score. One rule 
from this tree which gives a classification of 
deception can be extracted as follows: 
 
IF lhleft < -0.407407 AND lright <= 0.777778 
AND fmuor <=0.072831 AND rhright <= 
0.310345 AND rhclosed <=-0.93333 AND fhs 
<= -0.888889 AND fmour <=0.028317 and 
lright <=-1 and rleft <=-1 and fbla <=-
0.997762 and fblu <=-0.963101 and fmc > -
0.942354  THEN CLASS DECEPTION. 
 
Analysing this rule, as experts, we see information on 
four non-verbal channels associated with the eyes: 
left eye looking left (lleft), left eye looking right 
(lright), right eye half closed (rhclosed), right eye 
looking left (rleft) and 5 channels containing 
information about the state of the face including the 
horizontal movement of the face (fhs) face angular 
movement up-on-right (fmuor) and the degree of 
blushing/blanching (fblu). Face channels track face 
the movement along the X-axis and Y-axis using the 
coordinates and dimensions of the face found by the 
Face Object Locator ANN (Buckingham et al, 2012). 
Likewise, the state of each eye channel is determined 
from a Pattern Detector ANN (O’Shea et al, 2018) 
observing the left/right eye image and/or from the 
application of logical decision(s). The values for each 
channel are determined empirically by the pattern 
detector ANNS and the channel encoder ANNS in the 
bipolar range [1 and -1].  
In this application, the rules are complex and 
look at combinations of fine grained non-verbal 
behaviour i.e. movement of facial features. Due to 
this complexity, individual rules are difficult for an 
average human to comprehend. They could not for 
example be replicated by a human. As the problem is 
complex the tree is large – previous work (O’Shea et 
al, 2018b) suggests pruning may lead up to a 25% 
reduction in rules. A sacrifice in classification 
accuracy occurs but still the quantity of rules is large 
and difficult to comprehend. But is this problem 
scenario based? If automated profiling was applied to 
a simpler more typical problem, such as a bank loan 
or mortgage application then perhaps the learnt rules 
could be understand by all stakeholders – the expert, 
the member of the public and the bank manager.  
Consider for example, a small dataset containing 434 
instances for applications for personal loans. 238 
instances are reject samples and 196 accept. The 
dataset contains just 14 attributes. Using C4.5 and 10-
fold cross validation, a classification accuracy of 
74.8% is achieved and the best tree contained 27 
rules. A sample rule is shown below: 
 
IF TimeAtBank(years) <=2  AND 
TimeEmployed(years) < 1 AND 
 
ResidentStatus = “Rented” THEN Outcome 
= REJECT LOAN. 
  
A person, profiled by this system, could have the 
decision explained to them using this rule by a staff 
member at the bank i.e. they had not been a customer 
at the bank for long enough and had not been in 
employment for over a year and they currently lived 
in rented accommodation. What the staff could not do 
is explain and show the statistics behind the decision, 
nor guarantee that there was any bias in the training 
data that led to the model. Therefore,  neither the 
hypothesis H0 nor H1 can truly be accepted as 
explainability is determined by problem 
representation and complexity.  
6 CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has used a case study of adaptive 
psychological profiling to examine the challenges of 
how to produce explainable decisions of CI models to 
all stakeholders. There are many challenges for both 
the computational intelligence and the legal 
communities. Therefore, finding solutions which 
reflect technical realities while at the same time 
providing sufficient privacy safeguards will be 
crucial. This, however, requires a close collaboration 
of both the legal and technical community, which 
currently happens very rarely. A closer collaboration 
between both communities would allow better 
guidance, such as common guidelines for software 
developers, standardized frameworks which comply 
with the GDPR by default, and many more. 
Therefore, receiving answers to the questions raised 
in section 3.5 would be an important first step to 
further deepen the common understanding of 
technical and legal challenges relating to the GDPR 
and to foster a debate on the proper interpretation of 
the GDPR among the legal community, as well as 
information on how the technical community could 
be supported in their efforts to comply with legal 
requirements. 
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